rax=000001efd30a4001 rbx=0000000000000000 rcx=0000000000000001c	
rdx=ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff	
rip=00007ffbfcbdf96e	
r8=000000000001c00 r9=0000000000000000 r10=000001efd30a7fa0	
r11=000001efd30a7fd8 r12=0000000000000000 r13=0000000000000000	
r14=000000000000000 r15=000000000000000000000000000000000000	
iopl=0 nv up ei ng nz na po cy	
cs=0033 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=0001028	7
<pre>freerdp2!planar_skip_plane_rle+0x9e:</pre>	
00007ffb`fcbdf96e 0fb600 movzx eax,byte ptr [rax] ds:000001ef`d30	a4001=??

Out-of-bounds access

locate the original location:

```
static INLINE INT32 planar_skip_plane_rle(const BYTE* pSrcData, UINT32 SrcSize,
        UINT32 nWidth, UINT32 nHeight)
1
    UINT32 x, y;
    BYTE controlByte;
    const BYTE* pRLE = pSrcData;
    const BYTE* pEnd = &pSrcData[SrcSize];
    for (y = 0; y < nHeight; y++)
1È
1
        for (x = 0; x < nWidth;)
            int cRawBytes;
            int nRunLength;
            if (pRLE >= pEnd)
                return -1;
            controlByte = *pRLE++; 😥
            nRunLength = PLANAR CONTROL BYTE RUN LENGTH(controlByte);
   I
            cRawBytes = PLANAR_CONTROL_BYTE_RAW_BYTES(controlByte);
```

This is a bitmap-related function, pSrcData represents the cached data, and SrcSize represents the size. View the parent function that called the function:

There is already a problem here, integer overflow. The second parameter is an unsigned integer, but it may be negative here, causing the parameter SrcSize in the subfunction to be very large. However, the cause of this exception is not here yet. View the origin of planes [0]:

<pre>if (!bitmap->Decompress(context, b</pre>	itmap,
cacheBitma	pV2->bitmapDataStream,
cacheBitma	pV2->bitmapWidth,
cacheBitma	pV2->bitmapHeight,
cacheBitma	pV2->bitmapBpp,
cacheBitma	pV2->bitmapLength,
cacheBitma	pV2->compressed
RDP_CODEC_	ID_NONE))

Planes [0] is bitmapDataStream, and SrcSize is bitmapLength.

Look at the history of cacheBitmapV2::

```
static CACHE_BITMAP_V2_ORDER* update_read_cache_bitmap_v2_order(rdpUpdate* update, wStream* s,
BOOL compressed, UINT16 flags)
```

This function initializes a variable of type CACHE_BITMAP_V2_ORDER。

Details of initialization::

if (!update_read_4byte_unsigned(s, &cache_bitmap_v2->bitmapLength)
Read the bitmapLength variable here:

```
cache_bitmap_v2->bitmapDataStream = malloc(cache_bitmap_v2->bitmapLength);
```

Then use this bitmapLength to malloc a heap block.

The problem is that when the read bitmapLength is 0, the pointer points to the end of the heap block, and then in the function that triggered the exception, the heap block is read, and the read is traversed, resulting in an out-of-bounds access.